The United States Supreme Court first created the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement in the case of Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). This case involved a drunk driving investigation by members of a local police department in Wisconsin. The defendant in this case was a Chicago police officer who had been involved in an accident. The vehicle he was using had become disabled as a result of the accident and had been towed away. During their investigation of the accident, the police officers became aware of the defendant’s status as a member of the Chicago P.D. They conducted two searches of the vehicle believing that the officer was required to carry a gun with him at all times, even when he is off duty. The first search was conducted at the scene and the second was conducted at the garage where the vehicle had been towed. The purpose of these searches was to recover the weapon as a matter of public safety. The local police maintained standard procedures for these types of searches. During the course of their search for the gun, the police discovered evidence that tied the defendant to a homicide.

The USSC upheld the search as valid under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. Ordinarily, the search with be administrative in nature and will involve a vehicle that is disabled or has been abandoned on the highway. The search is not based upon an effort to find evidence of a crime, but rather to perform an administrative function per established departmental procedures, such as accounting for and safeguarding property or determining ownership of the vehicle in question.

The New Jersey Supreme Court has also recognized the existence of the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. Most of these scenarios concern fact patterns where individuals are driving extremely slow late at night leading officers to believe something is wrong. In these situations, it is reasonable for officers to believe that something is wrong with the car, something is wrong with the driver, or that the vehicle could constitute a hazard to other motorists. Each of these situations is justified under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement.

In State v. Washington, 296 N.J. Super 569 (App. Div. 1997), the observations of the arresting officer involved a vehicle that was weaving within the lane of travel and proceeding at a speed which was nine miles per hour below the posted speed limit. The court ruled that the traffic stop of the vehicle was justified based on the community caretaking exception. The court noted that the objective basis upon which to consider traffic stops under this exception is based upon the totality of the circumstances. Although weaving within the lane may not technically be a motor vehicle violation, the driving conduct offers sufficient justification for the officer to conduct a motor vehicle stop. Vehicles operated in this manner may constitute a danger to other motorists. In addition, there may be something wrong with the driver or the vehicle itself.

Apart from the drunk driving context, New Jersey case law has held that the community caretaking exception will also justify a limited search based on concerns for public safety. In State v. Diloreto, 180 N.J. 264 (2004), the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the police were justified in performing a pat-down search of a purportedly missing and endangered person. The justification for the search was based on the officers concerns that the endangered person might seek to injure himself or the police.

The United States Supreme Court has authorized exterior searches for vehicle identification numbers (VIN). This issue was analyzed in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986). In this case, New York City police officers stopped a vehicle for speeding. The vehicle also had a cracked windshied which is a violation of New York law. The defendant exited the vehicle and provided the police with proof of registration and insurance but no driver’s license.One of the officers involved in the stop opened the door to examine the VIN, which was located on the left doorjamb of the vehicle. When the officer did not find the VIN there, he reached into the interior of the car in order to move some papers that were obstructing the area of the dashboard where the VIN is located on late model automobiles. When the officer did so, the officer saw the handle of a gun protruding from under the driver’s seat. The weapon was immediately seized and the defendant was arrested.

The Supreme Court held that the VIN is a vital component in the regulation of automobiles. As such, motorists should expect a substantially diminished expectation of privacy in the VIN numbers to their vehicles. This is especially true of a driver who has committed a traffic violation. Since the VIN is generally accessible and visible from the exterior of the vehicle, an examination may not even constitute a search. Since there is no expectation of privacy in the VIN, no showing of probable cause or reasonable suspicion of a violation of law is necessary for an examination from the exterior of the vehicle for this number. The Supreme Court found that it makes no difference that papers in the defendant’s car obscured the VIN number from plain view. The Court held that efforts to restrict access to a particular area do not generate a reasonable expectation of privacy where none would otherwise exist.

The New Jersey view on impounding vehicles and inventory searches concerns the procedures surrounding the impoundment of a motor vehicle. New Jersey police must give the driver of the car a reasonable opportunity to make arrangements for the care of the vehicle before the police may impound it and conduct an inventory search. This rule applies regardless of whether the driver is to be taken into custody for a violation of law or the driver simply receives a ticket for the violation. Unless the driver gives his or her voluntary consent to the impoundment, the police must first give him or her an opportunity to make arrangements for the care of the vehicle.

Typically, if the driver is stopped by the police and is unable to continue his operation (because he is driving on a suspended license or because there is a bench warrant out for his arrest) the police must give the driver an opportunity to make arrangements for the care of the vehicle. The driver can arrange for a substitute driver to take the vehicle and the police may permit the operator to safely and legally park the vehicle rather than having it impounded.

Certain statutes provide police with authority to impound motor vehicles. For example, N.J.S.A. 39:3-4 authorizes police officers to remove any unregistered vehicle from a public highway. Also, police may remove from the roadway any disabled or unattended vehicle that blocks traffic. This statutory authority comes from N.J.S.A. 39:4-136. As long as the proper procedures are followed for a valid impoundment and inventory search, this is a valid exception to the warrant requirement.

Under New Jersey law, there is no exception to the warrant requirement that will justify a search of a motor vehicle for driving credentials. Absent a specific recognized exception to the warrant requirement (such as a search incident to arrest or consent search), police may not conduct vehicle searches to locate a motorist’s driver’s license, registration, insurance card, or other necessary driving documents. This was the holding by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Lark, 163 N.J. 294 (2000). Typically, in a credentials case, the police are confronted by a motorist who cannot produce his or her license, registration, or current insurance card. The police have a duty and responsibility to determine if the motorist is properly licensed, that the vehicle is not stolen, and that the vehicle is properly insured. The police are entitled to detain the motorist for this purpose. If the driver conceals their identity and there is no other alternative, the police may take the driver into custody. Presumably, the police could then impound the vehicle and conduct an inventory search (one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement).

Prior case law suggesting that police could conduct motor vehicle document searches as an aid to the motorist, so long as the search was limited to those areas where driving credentials are normally kept, such as a visor, center console, or glove compartment, has been overruled.

In general, a police initiated stop of a motor vehicle may be legally justified by three principles of law under both the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. First, a New Jersey police officer is entitled to conduct a traffic stop when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed a violation of the motor vehicle laws. Such suspicion may be based upon objectively reasonable evidence that the driver has committed a moving violation or that the vehicle is being operated in violation of the licensing, equipment, or registration laws of the State. The evidence supporting the traffic stop need not be sufficient to support a conviction and does not need to be based upon probable cause. All that is required is reasonable suspicion.

A second justification for a motor vehicle stop in New Jersey is the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. This exception, which I have previously discussed in various articles, essentially allows the police to stop a motor vehicle when there is objectively reasonable evidence for the police officer to conclude that something may be wrong with the vehicle or the driver.

A third justification for a traffic stop is based on New Jersey common law: Police have the right and obligation to effect a motor vehicle stop and inquire of a vehicle’s occupants when the police have objectively reasonable evidence to suggest that criminal activity is being planned or conducted.

The Chief Administrator of the Motor Vehicle Commission in New Jersey has been given the authority to create rules and regulations controlling the necessary equipment to be used on motor vehicles that are registered in NJ. All vehicles that are registered in this State must be properly equipped at all times. When a vehicle is not so equipped, it is in violation of the law and becomes subject to a motor vehicle stop by the police based upon one of the three reasons I just discussed. However, if a police officer effects a motor vehicle stop based upon a perceived violation for an equipment issue that does not actually exist, the stop is not justified under any theory as being objectively reasonable. The police officer’s good faith and subjective belief that he or she witnessed a violation are essentially irrelevant.

If a vehicle is to be impounded in New Jersey, does a driver or passenger have the right to remove personal possessions from the vehicle before the impoundment or inventory search? According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, occupants of an impounded motor vehicle maintain the right to make suitable arrangements for their personal possessions prior to an inventory search of an impounded motor vehicle. In State v. Mangold, the Court held that police have an affirmative duty to provide the vehicle’s occupants a reasonable opportunity to remove personal effects from an impounded motor vehicle prior to an inventory search. This assumes that the owner or other responsible individual is present at the time of the lawful impoundment. If this is the case, absent consent by the owner or other responsible party, the impounded vehicle may not be subject to an inventory search. In such cases, the owner or other responsible person will be presumed to have assumed the risk for any claims of loss or theft arising from the impoundment.

The rights afforded to the owners and operators of motor vehicles that are subject to an inventory search following an impoundment are based on Article 1, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution and are intended to afford people in New Jersey enhanced protection. Both the initial impoundment and the subsequent inventory search must be lawful. Also, the enhanced protections under the New Jersey Constitution apply even when the vehicle is impounded for the purpose of civil forfeiture.

N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 provides that New Jersey registered motor vehicles may not be driven with non-transparent materials affixed to the windows or lights. This concerns all the vehicles with tinted windows on the front driver’s side or passenger’s side. Based on this statute, New Jersey police conducted motor vehicle stops based on the presence of tinted windows on the vehicles. In State v. Cohen, 347 N.J. Super 375 (App. Div. 2002), the Appellate Division held that the statute in question does prohibit the use of tinted windows that fail to meet certain standards set forth in the New Jersey Administrative Code. The Appellate Division also concluded that the motor vehicle stop in Cohen could be justified under the community caretaking exception. The darkened windows of the vehicle were subject to inspection by the officer in order to determine if the equipment constituted a hazardous condition. Also, the traffic stop in Cohen was also justified under the common law right of inquiry, in that the officer had a reasonably-founded suspicion that the vehicle’s equipment constituted a violation of the motor vehicle statute.